Android Security Symposium
PhD School

Secure Copy Protection for Mobile Apps

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Faculty of Informatics (CS)

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Nils T. Kannengiesser
About me

Nils T. Kannengiesser, M.Sc.
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Research Associate at the division for Operating Systems / Prof. Dr. Uwe Baumgarten
  since March 2011
  • Computersysteme 2 (training, each summer)
  • Android Praktikum SS2011, WS11/12, SS12, WS12/13, SS13, WS12/13, […]
  • Advisor of lots of bachelor’s and master’s theses (see website for details)
  • Guest speaker at Texas A&M University (“Android security”) in April 12’ 13’ 14’

Assistant lecturer of Android intensive courses (Kiel & College Station/US; English)
Student assistant at Texas A&M University for Cisco Systems/Dallas, USA
Student worker (Administrator, Student assistant, etc. […]]
I studied Information Technology in Kiel, Germany & College Station, USA (2 sem.)
I’m interested in Android, JavaME, Sensor networks and IT security
My research area is Android Security (copy-protection)

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Secure Copy Protection for Mobile Apps

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Secure Copy Protection for Mobile Apps

Students’ contribution to my research topic by

Marius Muntean
Magnus Jahnen
Michael Bichlmeier
Patrick Bernhard
David Ellermann
Norbert Schmidbartl
Janosch Maier
Philipp Schreitmueller
Ioana Negoita
Patrick Bernardt
David Ellermann
Ozan Pekmezci
[...]

A huge “Thank you“!
Content

• Introduction
• Proposals
• Findings
• Ongoing research
• Temporary results
  • Conclusion/Future Work
• Related work
Introduction

• I started to **look for a dissertation topic in 2012**, while supervising student projects on data security using secure elements for Android

• In **2013 Android’s security came to my focus**, while discovering initial issues in regard to the easy reengineering possibilities of apps in conjunction with copyright protection by other researchers/hackers (**License Verification Library hacking**)

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**Example: LicenseValidator.smali**

```smali
[...]
.field private static final LICENSED:I = 0x0
.field private static final LICENSED_OLD_KEY:I = 0x2
.field private static final NOT_LICENSED:I = 0x1

[...]
.sparse-switch
0x0 -> :sswitch_d3
0x1 -> :sswitch_de
[...]
```

Introduction

Excursus: LVL

(License Verification Library)

Google provides example code that can be integrated into an application to include basic license management.

Introduction

- Why are copyright protection and obfuscation techniques actually important?
  - Developers face the issue of **lost revenue**
  - **Others might earn money** with it by repacking the app and exchanging ad-IDs
  - Customers might **get infected** by repackaged apps with trojans etc.
  - The discovered techniques and **proposed methods may protect other technologies like In-App-Billing**, too. (Notice: In-App-Billing is vulnerable to presented techniques, too. We even discovered further possibilities that cannot be disclosed right now.)
  - [...]
Introduction

• We investigated the reengineering issues further and found similar problems in recent LVL versions that use even signed replies for additional security.

• We found a way to manipulate LVL’s communication on the fly to trigger a valid license, by intercepting calls to exchange parameters used for the license verification. We faked public and private keys and used the Xposed framework for this purpose. It works with any application using the default examples codes on rooted devices.

• Google Android Security was notified about this issue by Sep. 5\textsuperscript{th} 2014 and classified it in a response “as a low severity issue since it requires the device to be rooted”

Notice: Almost any Android device may be rooted and one can discover root exploits every few months!

Ref. Marius Muntean / discussions / master’s thesis (not published)
Introduction

Notice: Almost any Android device may be rooted and one can discover root exploits every few months (so far)

Examples for root exploits

Ref. AP WS Kirschner, Schleemilch, Smarzly (not published) ; BA Janosch Maier
Introduction

Notice: Almost any Android device may be rooted and one can discover root exploits every few months (so far)

85% “insecure”
15% “maybe secure”
0, x% secure?
Introduction

Notice: Almost any Android device may be rooted and one can discover root exploits every few months (so far)

2015 ? “Stagefright”

Own your Android! Yet Another Universal Root

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Abstract

In recent years, to find a universal root solution for Android becomes harder and harder due to rare vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel base and also the exploit mitigations applied on the devices by various vendors.

In this paper, we will present our universal root solution. The related vulnerability CVE-2015-3636, a typical

Introduction

Summary:

It’s fair to assume that many devices may be rooted “legally” or by exploit and therefore reveal access to APKs’ private files, encrypted communication by “method call interception” etc.

This is a big issue for copyright protection, since it’s about hiding (license) information somehow from users/attackers.

Initial Research question:
How can be achieved that an app can only be used on “valid devices” (cf. license)?

Sub-questions:
Is there any solution for securing data, communication etc.?

Ref. Marius Muntean’s master’s thesis (not published)
### Introduction

Is there any solution for securing data, communication etc.?

**Yes, with different security levels:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>new hardware</th>
<th>plugin devices</th>
<th>software modification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TEEs</td>
<td>SEs</td>
<td>Enhan. OS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARM’s TrustZone</td>
<td>G&amp;D’s MSC</td>
<td>NSA’s SEAndroid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samsung’s Trustonic</td>
<td>Swissbit’s PS-100u</td>
<td>Fraunhofer’s TrustDroid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for KNOX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ref. AmiEs Symposium
Android Security Symposium – Secure Copy Protection for Mobile Apps

Introduction

Excursus TEEs and SEs “in a nutshell”

Trustonic for Samsung KNOX

APP Level

OS Level

HW Level

Peripheral Level

Introduction

Is there any solution for securing data, communication etc.?

Yes, with different security levels:

- **New hardware**
  - TEEs
    - ARM’s TrustZone
    - Samsung’s Trustonic for KNOX

- **Plugin devices**
  - SEs
    - G&D’s MSC
    - Swissbit’s PS-100u

- **Software modification**
  - Enhanced OS
    - NSA’s SEAndroid
    - Fraunhofer’s TrustDroid

Available to many devices / existing cooperations

Ref. AmiEs Symposium
Introduction

→ available to many devices / existing cooperations

→ USB-OTG required (Android 3.x / MicroSD-MicroUSB-Adapter)
→ O_DIRECT required (issues below)
→ Mounting USB storage devices required (root rights necessary)

For this reason we developed Libaums (Library to access USB Mass Storage Devices) that enables O_DIRECT access for files, while requiring no root rights. It allows the communication with SE’s applets finally. https://github.com/mjdev/libaums

Proposals

cf. “Dongle” / Desktop World

Bind apps and SE together to ensure license management / regulations

Proposals

... receive license information, decryption keys or user data from the MSC/SE that gathers its information from a remote server or the phone maybe (cf. device information)

Ref. AmiEs Symposium
Proposals

... using a secure element and an app.

- **Device and User identification** and act according to **predefined rules** (cf. license server) that are mirrored by the SE (cf. advantage: no internet connection.)

Ref. AmiEs Symposium; MA Norbert Schmidbartl / http://www.os.in.tum.de/fileadmin/w00bdp/www/Lehre/Abschlussarbeiten/Thesis_Final__Schmidbartl.pdf
Proposals

… using a secure element and an app.

- **Content protection** using keys received by the SE (server) that differentiate per version

- **String protection** using keys received by the SE (server) that differentiate per version

- **URL/API protection** by using One-Time-URLs that are generated by the server/SE on request and loose validity after a certain time

- **Execution obfuscation** by using reflections in conjunction with the SE to receive the actual “execution roadmap” during runtime. A static analysis (reengineering) will not work anymore.

Ref. AmiEs Symposium
Performance tests of a sample implementation for testing purposes reveal a limited usage possibility due to the slow performance of SEs (10khz CPU).

We were required to adapt some ideas to lower the SE requests, while speeding up the app this way.

Performance information:
APP <> SE: 250 Bytes / req. / 200ms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SEToServerCommunicationAsyncTask</td>
<td>Authentication of server</td>
<td>11.2 s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ReadDataAsyncTask</td>
<td>Read key from SE</td>
<td>0.9 s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WriteDataAsyncTask</td>
<td>Write key on SE</td>
<td>1 s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GetAppDataIP method</td>
<td>Get an IP that is saved in a variable on SE</td>
<td>0.2 s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GetLinksAsyncTask</td>
<td>Download related links from server</td>
<td>1.9 s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrypt method</td>
<td>Decrypts a String</td>
<td>0.001 s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All operations before original app</td>
<td>Time until original app main activity</td>
<td>17.8 s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. The duration of some Android operations are shown.

Ref. AmiEs Symposium ; BA Michael Bichlmeier (not published) ; BA Ozan Pekmezci (not published)
Findings

Using secure elements increases the security and combining further methods (obfuscation etc.) adds additional security layers against reengineering attacks.

Nevertheless there are still ways for further improvement that we are analyzing these days.

Ref. AmiEs Symposium ; MA Patrick Bernard (not published)
We are investigating the **additional security of native code** these days.

Current assumptions show that it might be beneficial to develop as much as possible code (especially license-related code) as native code, since it’s harder to reengineer.

Of course, this is not recommend by Google these days and according to them using C increases the app complexity. Different Android versions have different NDK versions, too.

Android 5.x?

Nevertheless Google **does not provide real solutions** here. Our recent research shows that DEX files are still included in OAT files used by the ART VM of newer Android versions. There is no security benefit with the newest Android versions on this matter.

ongoing research

For increasing e.g. copyright security we propose a new app market that compiles applications up front based on the hardware and with user/device attributes included to be executed by exactly that user/device only. There is native code only and it’s assumed to be more difficult to copy it.

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Android Device

Collects data

User details/Device details

App verifies internal properties with device before execution

[...]

App Market

Compiles app for user and device

provides native app
ongoing research

Due to our current results that native code is more secure, we are developing a pure native LVL similar to Google’s LVL, while storing license data on a SE for offline purposes. Maybe it’s possible to communicate with Google’s server even directly.

Temporary results (Conclusion)

Current solutions provided by Google (LVL) or Amazon (Amazon DRM) do not provide sufficient copyright protection and may be easily cracked (cf. automated tools).

Increasing the complexity of applications with obfuscation and encryptions methods, increases the security against reengineering already.

Using secure elements (SE) provides interesting solutions for offline-purposes that could have been realized with server solutions in the past only. Nevertheless SE do not have sufficient performance to process huge amounts of data. In fact we are limited to a few kilobytes here.

Ref. MA Patrick Bernard (not published) ; BA Bichlmeier (not published) ; BA Pekmezci (not published)
Temporary results (Future work)

Nevertheless secure elements do not provide sufficient performance and we are required to process lots of data within Android (insecure!) or on a remote server.

Future projects might concentrate on developing a performant SE.

On the other hand this gap might be solved by trusted execution environments (TEE) that seem to share the hardware with the host system, while running on a dedicated operating system.
Related work (most important ones)

Recently **Google announced** the future release of **Project Vault** at Google IO 2015. A secure element to be used and programmed by users.

Almost a decade ago, **Thomas Aura et al.** created a solution for license management using smartcards. Their statements still apply today:

> “there are always ways to work around the protection mechanisms [and only] [...] the time to market for pirated copies [may be increased] and that pirated products cannot be sold as authentic”

> “copy-protection is always to some extent security by obscurity”

**Wu Zhou et al.** developed the “first **VM-based protection** system for Android”. Unfortunately we need to assume that their approach is not useable with Android 5.x anymore due to ART and its precompilation.

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Ref. Thomas Aura, D. Gollmann “Software license management with smart cards” ;
Google IO https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mpbWQbkl8_g&t=2940 ;

Nils T. Kannengiesser
Related work (most important ones)

Furthermore all papers related to malware and copyright protections are of interest, since malware’s stealth techniques may be of interest for our copy protection, while other methods may be improved by our approach of secure elements maybe.

Examples that should be mentioned are a paper by Thansis Petsas et al. about malware’s techniques to avoid dynamic analysis as well as papers about “Online Execution Class” and “Encryption-based Copyright Protection” by Sung Ryul Kim et. al.

Of course, papers about TEEs like Trustonic or Samsung’s Trustonic for Knox are of interest in our future work section, too. Currently the usage of TEEs is limited to some vendors that own the keys and SDKs.


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Android Security Symposium

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Thanks for your attention

Comments? Questions?
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